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Defenses in Equity and "Legal Rights"
John P. Frank* and John Endicottt
The books are full of expressions to the effect that the law
will do dirty work which a "court of conscience" is too refined
to touch. Here are typical examples: "The company may have a
valid legal obligation against her, but a court of equity will not
enforce it when it is inequitable to do so. ..."I or, "With an action
at law available to appellants, with equity with the respondent,
and taking cognizance of more delicate distinctions between right
and wrong than may be had in courts of law ....-2 The Comment to Section 367 of the Restatement of Contracts observes:
"Even though the plaintiff's conduct has not been such as to cause
a court to refuse him a judgment for damages ... it may be such
as to disentitle him to the remedy of specific performance." The
Comment to Section 940 of the Restatement of Torts, under the
heading "Unclean Hands" makes a sharp distinction between the
"discretionary withholding of injunctive protection to a recognized right" and those misdeeds of a plaintiff which "operate,
as a matter of substantive law, to prevent the existence of tort
liability on the part of the defendant."
The precise question for analysis here is whether the distinction in law implicit in these quotations is also a distinction in
fact. The rule of law obviously contemplates that there may be
a legal remedy which survives a rejection of the equitable claim.
Does such a remedy actually exist?
To find out the practical value of that remedy at law, we
have examined 350 reported cases in which the defenses of clean
hands, inadequacy of consideration, hardship, and misrepresentation have been raised in the past ten years. In selecting the basic
list of 350 cases, we have excluded, first, the cases in which dismissal is solely on the grounds of adequacy of the remedy at
law, since this involves application of tradition and rules apart
* Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
t LL.B. 1953, Yale Law School. Professor Frank wishes to make explicit
that while this comment can fairly be called a collaboration, the basic
research was done by Mr. Endicott.
1. Savings Building & Loan Ass'n v. McCall, 20 Tenn. App. 68, 72, 95
S.W.2d 933, 935 (1935).
2. Eisenbeis v. Shillington, 349 Mo. 108, 116, 159 S.W.2d 641, 645 (1941).
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from the traditions of "conscience"; second, the cases in which
dismissal is on a balance of convenience, in which we assume
that the plaintiff does get damages if they can be calculated; and
third, the cases of dismissal for laches, since here the statute of
limitations is either an absolute and obvious barrier or no barrier
at all, and in the latter case we assume that a legal remedy is
sought if it is of any value.
Of the 350 "pure conscience" cases, 150 most clearly turned
on clean hands, inadequacy of consideration, hardship, or misrepresentation. Letters were sent to counsel of record inquiring
as to the subsequent history of these 150 cases. Fifty-six responses
were received. While the sample is too small to permit of firm
conclusions, the results are sufficiently suggestive to be worth
reporting as a possible starting point for analysis by others.
The fifty-six surviving cases were utterly diverse, involving
specific performance and injunction, tort and contract. Yet in
one respect they were uniform: In every instance, an equitable
defeat was a total defeat. In no instance did the defeated claimant gain anything by virtue of any reserved legal rights; in only
two instances did he so much as try.3
The reasons why equitable defeat uniformly worked total
defeat are classified below.
Reasons for Defeat
1. Equivalent legal defense. In ten cases, claimant believed
that the same defense which barred him in equity would, in perhaps slightly different form, bar him at law. For example, in
Ledirk Amusement Co. v. Schechner,4 plaintiff sued to require
defendant to convey two theaters to him which, plaintiff alleged,
defendant had purchased as his broker. But defendant "broker"
was also thought by the seller to be the seller's agent, a fact
known to the plaintiff; and relief was therefore denied on the
theory that plaintiff's knowledge of defendant's duty to the seller
gave plaintiff unclean hands in attempting to make the defendant his own agent. The plaintiff made no effort to recover at
law, on the theory that the doctrine of in pari delicto would, in
the light of his equitable defeat, bar his legal claim; and in pari
delicto was in fact so used in two other cases.5
3.
4.
5.
infra.

See the MacRae and Furman litigations, discussed in notes 15-18 infra.
133 N.J. Eq. 602, 33 A.2d 894 (Ch. 1943).
These are the McRae and Furman matters, discussed in notes 15-18
Similarly in Hoover v. Wright, 202 S.W.2d 83 (Mo. 1947), a claim for
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Claims were abandoned on the belief that unclean hands
would be found fraud at law;6 equitable mistake might equal
legal mistake;7 or, analogically only, laches might be converted
into breach of contract.8 In one case, inadequacy of consideration
freed defendant from an equitable estoppel, and thus permitted
him to meet a damages claim with a defense of Statute of Frauds.9
These cases point up the obvious fact that a legal remedy theospecific performance against the vendor in a land contract was defeated on
the dual grounds of inadequacy of consideration and want of mental capacity
by the vendor. The contract price was $100 an acre, and testimony showed
the land was at most worth $125 an acre, not a large discrepancy. The evidence also showed that the defendant was "slipping" and had lost his
business acumen; shortly after the trial he was declared to be of unsound
mind. The plaintiff abandoned his claim in the belief that the mental state
of the defendant would defeat him at law.
6. W. K. Ewing Co. v. Krueger, 152 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941),
action by vendor for specific performance of a land contract; defense, parol
evidence showing that the plaintiff had told defendant at the time of contracting that defendant would not be held to the agreement. Held, dismissed
because of plaintiff's unclean hands. Counsel for plaintiff wrote that if plaintiff had sued for damages only, "the defendant could still have injected the
fact that the contract was procured by fraud and that having so procured
there should be no recovery for damages based on it as it would be entirely
vitiated, so the same result would have been reached." Letter from Clinton G.
Brown: Jr., San Antonio, Texas, March 14, 1952.
7. Eisenbeis v. Shillington, 349 Mo. 108, 159 S.W.2d 641 (1941). Action for
specific performance by vendor on land contract. Plaintiff's real estate agent
had informed defendant that he could build a $14,000 house on the lot,
whereas in fact building restrictions required a house valued at $20,000.
Held, dismissed because, while there was no legal fraud, the mistake precluded specific performance. Counsel for plaifitiff concluded that the prospects of recovery at law were too slim to warrant further expense.
8. Doering v. Fields, 187 Md. 484, 50 A.2d 553 (1947), action for specific
performance on land contract by vendee. Plaintiff had 45 days in which to
make tender, got a ten day extension; two days after the expiration of the
extension, he did make tender which the defendant-vendor refused. His suit
was dismissed solely for the delay in tender, and plaintiff's counsel concluded
that if the same matter were raised at law, the two day delay would have
been treated as breach of the contract.
9. Dessert Seed Co. v. Garbus, 66 Cal. App.2d 838, 153 P.2d 184 (1944).
Plaintiff-vendee sought specific performance and damages on a contract for
the sale of a crop of onion seed, which he had already partially resold. He
had duly made tender, and defendant had repudiated the contract. The
underlying facts, abridged from a letter of Mr. Reginald L. Knox, Jr., El
Centro, California, March 14, 1952, were that the seed was of a type which,
before the war, had been almost entirely imported. The torpedoing of one
ship during the war, carrying almost an entire year's supply, caused the
domestic price to jump from $1.00 a pound to $3.50 a pound. Defendant thereupon began producing onion seed in the Imperial Valley, and as foreign
supply was more completely cut off, prices continued to rise to $4.50 and
finally to $7.00 a pound. The court denied specific performance upon the
ground of inadequacy of consideration, and then reached the issue of damages. At this point, defendant relied on the statute of frauds; plaintiff countered with the contention that defendant was barred from raising this
defense by equitable estoppel; and the court, giving decision for defendant
as to damages on the statute of frauds ground, held that defendant was not
barred by equitable estoppel because, due to the inadequate consideration,
there was no equity in the case.
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retically reserved is useless if there is a legal parallel to the
defense in equity.
2. Absence of effective legal remedy. In about 40 per cent
of the cases there was no analogous legal remedy.
Good examples are actions to establish, rescind, or reform
instruments. In one instance, plaintiff failed to secure cancellation of a deed to defendant, on the clean hands ground that the
deed had been made to defraud plaintiff's creditors. Since the
deed admittedly conveyed legal title, claimant had no remedy
when cancellation failed. 10 In a similar case in which plaintiff
sued to cancel for want of consideration a mortgage given to
defendant, the defendant set up clean hands on the ground that
the mortgage was given to defraud creditors, and also asked foreclosure. The court, with the stroke of Solomon, accepted the clean
hands defense and refused cancellation; but it also held that the
want of consideration might be offered defensively, and refused
foreclosure. The decision left the property covered by a mortgage
which could be neither cancelled nor foreclosed, a puzzle no legal
action would solve."
In other cases to reform or set aside contracts or enjoin torts,
plaintiffs defeated in equity abandoned their suits because of
12
inability to conceive of any useful legal remedy.
10. Leeper v. Kurth, 349 Mo. 938, 163 S.W.2d 1031 (1942). One of plaintiff's creditors then sued him, got judgment, and had the deed set aside as a
fraud on creditors.
11. Brown v. Rowland, 137 N.J. Eq. 462, 45 A.2d 592 (Oh. 1946). The attorney of record believes that the only solution for plaintiff is to wait twenty
years, and then have the mortgage cancelled under a local arrangement under
which mortgages can be cancelled when no payment has been made for that
period.
A similar problem arose in Tutt v. Van Voast, 36 Cal. App.2d 282, 97 P.2d
869 (1939). Defendant was in possession of property, of which she had been
mortgagee, by virtue of a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff possessed a sheriff's
certificate on 45% of the property, based on an interest of one of the original
mortgagors. Defendant had failed to join plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding, and in the instant case, plaintiff sued for partition and accounting.
The court dismissed, holding that plaintiff could not "do equity" and have
clean hands except by paying his predecessor-in-title's share of the mortgage.
Thereafter defendant "claimed the property openly and notoriously and
paid all the taxes thereon for over a period of five years, after which time
the title insurance company gave her a policy of title insurance and she sold
it. The only one who could cause her trouble would of course, be Tutt, and
under this decision . . . he could not become an actor against her until and
unless he did equity." Letter from Mr. Lilburn Gibson, Ukiah, California,
March 11, 1952.
12. Examples follow. In Smith v. Nix, 206 Ga. 403, 57 S.E.2d 275 (1950),
plaintiff claimed to be a silent partner in defendant's liquor business and
sought an accounting. Since Georgia law forbade silent partners in that
business, the court denied the claim on grounds of unclean hands, leaving
nothing further for plaintiff to do. Similarly, in Bute v. Stickney, 160 S.W.2d
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3. Procedural barriersto legal claims. In the few remaining
un-unified states, an equitable claim can easily be dismissed
without prejudice to bringing a legal claim, and hence without
fear of res judicata. However, in the code states, the commonly
followed New York rule against splitting the legal and equitable
elements of a cause of action requires a plaintiff either to present
both elements of his claim at the beginning or to amend and
proceed in the same cause after an equitable defeat.18 To this
limited extent, the rule against splitting bars a legal remedy.
302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), plaintiff bought mineral lands as an agent of
defendant, and transferred them to defendant in a written agreement. He
subsequently sought to cancel this instrument and to impose a resulting trust
on an interest in the lands which he claimed as a commission. However,
plaintiff had received a secret payment from the vendor for negotiating the
sale, and the court construed this to be disloyalty to his defendant-principal
which warranted dismissal of the cancellation suit for reason of unclean
hands. Plaintiff's attorney concluded that with the writing outstanding,
there was no possible legal remedy.
In Dutch Maid Bakeries v. Schleicher, 58 Wyo. 374, 131 P.2d 630 (1942),
the court refused to enforce an agreement not to compete, otherwise valid,
on the ground that the agreement had been too hard a bargain. Mr. John U.
Loomis, Cheyenne, plaintiff's attorney, in a letter of March 21, 1952, said,
"The only effective remedy we had was an injunction to prevent competition
by Schleicher. Damages at law would have been difficult, if not impossible,
to prove. Under these circumstances, I doubt whether we ever considered
the advisability of an action at law." As of 1952, both parties were still in
business.
In Albright v. Karston, 206 Ark. 307, 176 S.W.2d 421 (1943), plaintiff, a
bookmaker who had been raided, sought to enjoin police from further
molestation of his property. He alleged that the raid was without a valid
warrant. The court, denying relief, found that he had unclean hands, an
occupational disease since it was illegal to make book in Arkansas. According
to Mr. E. L. McHaney, Jr., Little Rock, Arkansas, March 4, 1952, no further
action was taken. "As the report indicates, the great majority of the property,
which was gambling equipment, was destroyed at the time it was taken.
However . . . a clock and radio had not been destroyed. After the suit was
concluded, the state police voluntarily returned this property to Karston."
All that could do the plaintiff any substantial good was an injunction
against further molestation.
In Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), plaintiff sought
an injunction and an accounting for patent infringement. The Court, finding
attempted monopoly by plaintiff, dismissed for unclean hands. According to
Mr. Still E. Ezell, St. Louis, Missouri, March 6, 1952, "Since we were interested in an injunction, there was no remedy for our client."
13. Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901), which originated
as an
action in the nature of ejectment to have defendant's house removed from
its encroachment on plaintiff's property. Title was found to be in plaintiff,
and a writ was issued to the sheriff which he returned because removal was
impracticable. Plaintiff's motion to require defendant to remove the structure was denied. Instead of appealing, plaintiff brought a new action, in the
nature of an action in equity, to compel defendant to remove. This second
action was dismissed for splitting the cause of action, on the ground that
there was only one cause of action and that plaintiff should have appealed
the original order denying his motion that defendant remove the construction. See similarly Gilbert v. Boak Fish Co., 86 Minn. 365, 90 N.W. 767 (1902),
holding that a successful suit to enjoin a nuisance could not be followed by
a separate action for damages. The point has been reiterated with particular
frequency In the Texas cases included in this study; Bute v. Stickney, 160
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Uncertainties as to the precise relationship of the clean hands
doctrine, which is purely equitable, and the principle of in pari
delicto, which is both legal and equitable, creates some problem
as to whether an "equitable dismissal" based on haphazard references to both of these grounds of dismissal is res judicata in a
14
suit for damages.
For examples, in MacRae v. MacRae,15 a husband to defraud
creditors transferred land to his wife, and, for the same reason,
they both then transferred to B. The wife sued the husband and
B for reconveyance of the property, which was denied on the
grounds that the parties were in pari delicto and had unclean
hands. When the wife thereafter sued B for damages for breach
of contract to reconvey, the court held the first decision res judicata and a bar to the suit. 16 In Furman v. Furman, a husband
and wife had put funds in joint bank accounts under fictitious
names to avoid deficiency judgments and the effects of bankS.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); W. K. Ewing Co. v. Krueger, 152 S.W.2d
488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Rabbe v. Federal Land Bank of Houston, 161
S.W.2d 1097 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
14. Properly considered, the rule of in part delicto is both a traditional
subdivision of the clean hands maxim and a rule of law. Pomeroy's Equity

Jurisprudence § 940 (5th ed. 1941), and see also id. § 402; Barnes v. Starr,
64 Conn. 136, 28 Atl. 980, 984 (1894). In the strict sense, in part delicto covers
only illegal and fraudulent conduct, in which both parties are substantially
equally implicit; while the clean hands rule applies to conduct which is
merely unconscionable, and of course has no requirement of equivalent
responsibility. Loose use of these terms can make it acutely mystifying as to
whether an order denying equitable relief was intended to be rested on in part
delicto, technically considered (in which case there can obviously be no legal
relief on the theory of res judicata), or on clean hands (in which case at least
theoretically there might be legal relief). An example of a conscientious
effort to determine the point is the opinion of Judge Shientag, in Furman v.
Furman, 34 N.Y.S.2d 699, 178 Misc. 582 (1941), more fully described infra
note 18.
15. 37 Ariz. 307, 294 Pac. 280 (1930).
16. MacRae v. Betts, 40 Ariz. 454, 14 P.2d 253 (1932). Here plaintiff
claimed that she had conveyed the title in trust to B to reconvey if he could
not exchange the property at issue for property in Los Angeles. Held, that
plaintiff was still relying on the original deed to establish her own title, and

that the first decision was res judicata as to this. Subsequently the husband
remarried and, shortly before his death, conveyed all his property to his
second wife. After his death, the second wife sued the first wife (plaintiff
in the above cases) alleging that the original conveyance was void as
against creditors of the husband's estate. The second wife was the only
creditor, and this by virtue of having paid the funeral expenses. The second
wife's suit was dismissed on the ground of her unclean hands, since it was
the transfer of his property to her immediately before death that made the
estate unable to pay its debts. MacRae v. MacRae, 57 Ariz. 157, 112 P.2d 213
(1941). (The property had come back to the first wife most circuitously; she
had mortgaged the property to her lawyers as security for legal fees before
the Arizona Supreme Court's decision in the first case of the sequence of
three. After the second case, the lawyers sued her and Betts to foreclose
the mortgage; it was foreclosed, and after title had been acquired by the
lawyers, it was deeded by them back to their client, the first wife.)
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ruptcy. The wife withdrew the funds, investing part of them in
an annuity, and the husband sued her to recover that part of the
funds and to establish a lien on the annuity policy. The court
denied relief on clean hands grounds, with an allusion to the
lawless purpose for which the money was deposited but with no
specific reference to in pari delicto.17 The husband then sued at

law to recover money fraudulently concealed from creditors, and
this second suit was barred on the grounds that since the identical
facts and issues were involved, and the parties had been in pari
5
delicto, the first suit was res judicata.'
4. Practicalbarriersto legal claims. In almost half the cases,
plaintiff lost interest in the dispute. Property values had
changed, 9 damages were not worth the bother, 20 the case had
become moot, 21 the only solvent defendant had been absolved of
17. 17 N.Y.S.2d 907 (1939), aff'd without opinion 259 App. Div. 988, 20
N.Y.S.2d 1017 (1940), appeal dismissed 284 N.Y. 591, 29 N.E.2d 666 (1940).
18. Furman v. Furman, 262 App. Div. 512, 30 N.Y.S.2d 516 (1941), two
judges dissenting on the ground that since the original dismissal was on
clean hands grounds, plaintiff might still be entitled to recover at law;
aff'd without opinion 287 N.Y. 772, 40 N.E.2d 643 (1942).
After the text decision, the wife purchased the deficiency judgment
which the couple had been trying to escape. The cost was low, and she
used part of "the very money" she had stolen from her husband, vesting the
deficiency judgment in her paramour. In a suit against the wife and her
paramour to declare the husband the owner of the deficiency judgment, the
defendants offered the defenses of res judicata and clean hands. Since
the parties were different, res judicata was not applicable; and while the
court had considered the parties' misdeeds equal when the wife bought an
annuity, it held that when she bought a deficiency judgment for the purpose
of helping her friend to harass her husband, she had gone too far; her conduct had become so much worse than her husband's that he was allowed to
proceed. Furman v. Krauss, 175 Misc. 1018, 26 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1941), aff'd
without opinion, 262 App. Div. 1016, 30 N.Y.S.2d 848 (1941) (but see for
related discussion of the case, Furman v. Furman, 262 App. Div. 512, 513,
30 N.Y.S.2d 516, 517 [1941)).
19. W. K. Ewing Co. v. Krueger, 152 S.W.2d 488 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
The apartment building at issue in a suit for specific performance of a purchase contract was sold to another person at a higher price.
20. McKee v. Fields, 187 Ore. 323, 210 P.2d 115 (1949). Plaintiff sought a
mandatory injunction to compel defendant to remove a cement wall which
encroached from 1 inch to 4% inches on plaintiff's property. While the suit
was pending, defendant made legitimate efforts to have a third person
buy plaintiff's property with a view to settlement of the boundary dispute,
and plaintiff dissuaded the third person with a fanciful argument that the
purchase would be illegal. This conduct was held to amount to unclean
hands on the part of plaintiff, and the court dismissed the. suit. Mr. Harold
A. Olson, North Bend, Oregon, December 3, 1951, wrote that, "This seems to
be one of those cases in which many interesting and difficult points of law
could be raised, but in actual practice when the value of property is small,
neither the client nor the attorney can afford to spend time and effort which
might be necessary to exhaust all legal possibilities and remedies. There
seems to be a theoretical and a practical side to the practice of law."
21. In Bourianoff v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.S.2d 50 (1941),
aff'd without opinion 263 App. Div. 802, 32 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1941), plaintiff sought
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any responsibility,2 2 and so on through all the practical alternatives 23-including one case in which the plaintiff solved at least
this one of his problems by marrying the defendant. 24 In one
to compel defendant landlord to permit telephone company employees to
install telephone wires for service to plaintiff. Defendant's reluctance
stemmed from an underlying labor dispute involving other persons working
on the project. The request was denied, and plaintiff was left to his remedy
at law. Mr. Walter G. Merritt, New York City, July 3, 1951, replied, "In the
course of time, however, which elapsed the building trades working on the
Parkchester development finished their work so that they lost their strategic
position to prevent the telephone employees from resuming work and completing the job. The result was that finally after many extensions of time
the case was dismissed as moot."
In Crouch Transp. System v. Hargus, 35 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Mo. 1938),
a decision denying an injunction against the state's interference with
plaintiff's business resulted in a dissolution of plaintiff corporaton and its
withdrawal from Missouri, mooting the issue. In Devon Knitwear Co. v.
Levinson, 19 N.Y.S.2d 102, 173 Misc. 779 (1940), dismissal of an application for
an injunction against picketing was followed by settlement of the labor dispute, which mooted the matter. In Renaud Sales Co. v. Davis, 104 F.2d 683
(1st Cir. 1939), an application for injunction against infringement of trademark and unfair competition was dismissed for want of clean hands; but
plaintiff company had been formed only to liquidate an inventory, and the
job was done by the time the case was over.
22. In Savings Building & Loan Ass'n v. McCall, 20 Tenn. App. 68, 95
S.W.2d 933 (1935), the net effect of a complicated fact situation was that a
claim was made on a destroyed note against the maker and two sureties. The
case was dismissed as to the only solvent defendant because of a want of
clean hands by the plaintiff. Mr. Kent Herrin, Johnson City, Tennessee, September 4, 1951, reported that the release of the solvent defendant had the
effect of making any further action appear valueless, and hence no further
legal action followed.
23. In Neely v. Merchants Trust Co. of Red Bank, N.J., 113 F.2d 953
(3d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 311 U.S. 705 (1940), plaintiff was completely
out of funds, so that it was unlikely that he went further for this reason if
for no other. In Heffron v. Rosenberg, 51 Cal. App.2d 156, 124 P.2d 74 (1942),
any further action would have required one of the parties to admit perjury
in a prior suit, and this was sufficient to deter further proceedings.
In Abell v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 192 Md. 438, 64 A.2d 722 (1949), the
losing party took no further action because he was substantially satisfied with
the results of his "loss." A company had issued 1,000 bonds, to be redeemed
serially, secured by a $1,000,000 mortgage. Almost all the bonds had been
redeemed by the time of suit except plaintiff's $13,000 worth, and defendant,
trustee of the mortgage, had relinquished the mortgage to the company.
Plaintiff sued to set aside that release as void. The court, agreeing that the
trustee had no power to relinquish the mortgage so long as any bonds were
outstanding, felt that it was unconscionable to maintain a $1,000,000 mortgage
to cover a $13,000 debt, particularly when the company needed capital to
expand. The court therefore denied the equitable remedy, suggesting methods
of obtaining damages. The attorney involved replied to our inquiry that his
client secured, by virtue of this decision, what he really wanted; since the
decision, the trustee has called the bonds serially and on the date of redemption, as provided in the original indenture, and interest is meanwhile being
regularly paid. In case of any default, it will be time enough for the client
to avail himself of the legal remedies suggested by the decision.
24. Coker v. Supreme Industrial Life Ins. Co., 43 So.2d 556 (La. App.
1950). Plaintiff, alleging ownership of the stock in the hands of the individual
defendant on the ground that he had paid for them and had vested them in
defendant only to qualify her for the board of directors, sued to enjoin her
from exercising control of the stock and the company from holding any
meetings of stockholders. The suit was dismissed on clean hands grounds

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XIV

instance in which an action at law might have succeeded, plaintiff
left the jurisdiction for personal reasons and abandoned the
suit. 25

In another case, a vendor seeking specific performance

became most content to forget the matter when his property
increased in value by 50 per cent while the equitable suit was
26
on appeal.
5. Settlements. Six cases were settled after the equitable
defeat, with none of them involving any benefit to the plaintiff
based on a theory of a residual legal interest. An example of a
settlement which did no more than clean up the muddle left by
the equitable decision is Gavina v. Smith,27 in which defendant
had an option for an oil and gas lease from plaintiff. Defendant
tendered his funds, which plaintiff rejected, and defendant paid
the money in escrow. Plaintiff sued to quiet title, alleging that
defendant's exercise of the option created only an executory
contract to make a lease. The court denied relief for want of
clean hands, since plaintiff's own behavior had prevented execution of the contract. The decision left plaintiff with land to which
he could not quiet title, and defendant with an option he could
not enforce. The parties settled with a new lease.
The parties were left in a similarly unsatisfactory state in
Byers v. Fuller.28 Plaintiff leased oil and gas lands to defendant,
defendant having an option to purchase and an obligation to
clean the wells. Plaintiff sued to recover possession when defendant failed to clean wells, and defendant counterclaimed for
specific performance of the option. The court refused possession
to plaintiffs, because there was no forfeiture provision in the
because of a statutory requirement that directors be bona fide shareholders.
This decision precluded the injunction but did not settle the issue of ownership of the stock, and the case was fixed for trial on that point. It was subsequently dismissed because of the marriage.
25. Rech v. Borst, 63 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1946), was an action of specific performance of a contract to purchase land which was dismissed because of
misrepresentations by the plaintiff which were neither fraudulent nor
malicious. Plaintiff then left the state for unrelated business reasons, and
abandoned the matter.
26. Clay v. Landreth, 187 Va. 169, 45 S.E.2d 875 (1948) was a suit for specific performance by a vendor on a land contract. It was dismissed on the
ground that plaintiff had known and defendant had not of impending zoning
alteration which would make the land useless for defendant's purposes, and
that therefore it would be inequitable to enforce the contract specifically.
Mr. James P. Hart, Jr., Roanoke, Virginia, February 4, 1952, wrote, "While
the case was being tried in the appellate court and shortly subsequent
thereto land values advanced to such an extent that it became obvious to
the plaintiff that the land had advanced from the $8,000 contract price to
about $12,000. Therefore, there was no action at law and no settlement."
27. 25 Cal.2d 501, 154 P.2d 681 (1944).
2& 58 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Ky. 1945).
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lease, but it also refused specific performance on the theory that
defendant had unclean hands for failing to comply with the agreement to clean the wells. This left plaintiff as lessor of lands of
which he could not get possession, and defendant as lessee of
lands he wanted to own. In settlement, plaintiff bought the surrender of the lease for the amount of defendant's original investment plus a good consideration.
The other settlements also attached no value to a theoretically
still extant legal claim. Here, as in all the other categories discussed, the plaintiff in fact lost as much by his equitable defeat
as if his defeat had been theoretically complete.
Conclusions
In view of the smallness of the sample, only tentative conclusions can be offered. These are:
First, a defeat because of a defense in equity is in fact final,
regardless of theoretical reservations.
Second, that in one basic sense the legal system is
satisfactorily in these cases. One proceeding ought to
these matters without duplicating litigation even in
case, and the system as it works almost never results
proceedings.

operating
terminate
the same
in second

Third, there is here at least a possibility of serious judicial
self-deception. Whether judges are deluded on this score is not
known, and it is possible that, when they recite a "seek thy relief
at law," they are aware that this is only a form of words. If,
however, the judge occasionally denies an equitable remedy
because he really believes that a legal remedy somehow remains,
and if without that mistaken belief he might have given judgment for the plaintiff, then serious injustice is done.
If all the defenses in equity under discussion here were bodily
and overtly taken out of the cloud of conscience and transferred
to law, this particular small problem would disappear. This study
is obviously not broad enough to warrant a conclusion as to the
wisdom of such a transfer. It is broad enough to suggest that so
far as claimants in equity are concerned such a transfer would
not cost them anything substantial; and it might help them by
increasing the conscious responsibility of the judge.
At a minimum, the law should be rewritten to dispel any
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illusion there may be that an equitable defeat on grounds of clean
hands, want of consideration, hardship, or misrepresentation
leaves a valuable legal right. Whether or not the sophisticated
are fooled, the language as it stands is needlessly misleading to
the uninitiated.

